Gender Schema Theory

Black: AO1 - Description
Blue: AO2 - Research
Red: AO3 - Evaluative points/IDAs


Suggested by Martin and Halverson, this is a similar cognitive theory to Kohlberg's theory, emphasising the active role of the child and their thinking in their gender development. However, it differs from Kohlberg's in claiming that basic gender identity is enough for a child to actively seek to observe and imitate gender-appropriate behaviour (Kohlberg had suggested that this only happens at the gender constancy phase, around age 7) , and suggesting that the development of schemas affects later behaviour, especially in terms of memory and selective attention.


GST suggests that gender develops through the formation of schemas - mental clusters of related items which together represent a concept relating to the world. Children learn schemas from information received from their parents, other children, and media such as books and television. This leads to the development of a schema of gender-appropriate behaviour - what toys to play with, what to wear, how to act and so on. Through identifying as a boy or a girl, children join an ingroup, leading them to positively evaluate their own group, and negatively evaluate outgroups (the other sex.) This motivates the child to be like their own group and to avoid the behaviour of the opposite sex, and actively seek information about their ingroup's behaviour, acquiring an ingroup schema.


This leads to the resilience of gender beliefs, where the child holds firm and rigid schemas that are resistant to change, influencing selective attention. They will ignore or misremember information that conflicts with their schemas - for example, if a boy sees a film with a male nurse, the existing schema is not altered - this schematic anomaly is ignored.


Supporting evidence for the early formation of schemas as an aspect of GST comes from a study by Campbell (2000.) A visual preference technique was used to observe babies aged 3, 9 and 18 months, finding in both sexes a preference for observing same-sex babies (more noticeable in boys) - with both genders preferring to watch "male" activities. This supports Martin and Halverson's suggestion that babies develop schemas long before they are able to speak, and that schemas drive selective attention - supporting GST's central tenet of gender ingroup formation leading to selective attention to same-sex ingroup members exhibiting gendered behaviour.


Further supporting evidence for GST comes from Poulin-Dubois et al, who asked 63 Canadian toddlers to choose a doll to carry out a series of tasks typically thought male, female or neutral. Girls aged 24 months chose the "gender-appropriate" doll, which boys did not do until 31 months. This is concordant with Cambell's findings that young children pay selective attention on a sex basis between the age of 24 and 31, far before Kohlberg's suggested age of 7 years.


However, both of these studies found gender differences between boys and girls - in Campbell's study, boys preferred to watch same-sex activities, whereas girls preferred to watch opposite-sex activities; in Poulin-Dubois et al's study, girls and boys developed the ability to identify gendered behaviour at different ages. GST claims that boys and girls develop their gender identity in the same way, so it cannot account for these differences. It would be beta bias to generalise the same developmental mechanisms to both genders, as research evidence suggests that girls and boys develop their schemas in different ways at different times.


Tenenbaum and Leaper criticised GST, claiming that it doesn't explain where schemas originate from, only their role - despite the importance of schemas - and sought to explain this aspect of GST. Carrying out a meta-analysis of 43 studies involving 10'000 participants, they looked for a relationship between the gender schemas of parents, and those of their children. They found an overall correlation of +0.16 - weak, but significant. This indicates that gender schemas are partially learnt through socialisation by parents - this correlation was too significant to be explained by chance.


Tenenbaum and Leaper's research can be considered culturally biased, taking place in predominantly Western and industrialised countries such as North America and Europe, with only 1 of 43 taking place in Asia. Bearing in mind how much parenting practices differ between cultures, it's imposing an etic to suggest that inheriting schemas from parents through socialisation is a global developmental norm - other cultures may place less emphasis as European cultures do on children growing up to be a reflection of their parents' beliefs and values.


GST helps us understand why children's beliefs and attitudes about gender roles and behaviours are so inflexible - children only pay selective attention to information that is consistent with or confirms their schemas.  Therefore, if children see someone engaging in a schema-inconsistent behaviour they'll ignore or forget it.


Compared to the biological approach, this theory heavily supports the role of nurture, suggesting gender is learnt through ingroup schemas and observation/imitation of the same sex; the biological approach supports natural factors such as the influence of hormones, chromosomes and neuroanatomy as being the most important factors in gender development. Both theories have research to support them - with evidence such as the David Reimer case study supporting the role of genetics, and Campbell et al's visual preference technique supporting the role of selective attention. There is evidence for both sides of the debate, leading to the increasing popularity of the interactionalist biosocial approach, suggesting that gender is a result of both biology and environment.


This approach is based around social learning from members of same-sex ingroups, suggesting that we learn gender appropriate behaviour through the socialisation process. Kohlberg's cognitive developmental approach suggests a similar method - we pass through developmental phases of how we understand gender, but only at the stage of gender constancy experienced after the age of 7, do we pay selective attention to gendered behaviour. Although the approaches are similar, they differ strongly in this key factor, with Martin and Halverson suggesting that we have the cognitive ability to observe and imitate gendered behaviour from between two and three years old.